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ABSTRACT
With the wide application of cloud storage, cloud security has become a crucial concern. Related
works have addressed security issues such as data confidentiality and integrity, which ensure that
the remotely stored data are well maintained by the cloud. However, how to define zero-knowledge
proof algorithms for stored data integrity check has not been formally defined and investigated. We
believe that it is important that the cloud server is unable to reveal any useful information about the
stored data. In this paper, we introduce a novel definition of data privacy for integrity checks, which
describes very high security of a zero-knowledge proof. We found that all other existing remote
integrity proofs do not capture this feature. We provide a comprehensive study of data privacy and
an integrity check algorithm that captures data integrity, confidentiality, privacy, and soundness.
Keywords Data Integrity · Data Privacy · Cloud Storage · Cyber Security · Cryptography.
1 Introduction
Cloud computing offers different types of computational services to end users via computer networks, demonstrating
a huge number of advantages. It has been becoming a trend that individuals and IT enterprises store data remotely
on the cloud in a flexible on-demand manner, which has become a popular way of data outsourcing. This can greatly
reduces the burden of storage management and maintenance and brings a great advantage of universal data access and
convenience to users. In fact, cloud storage has become one of the main parts in cloud computing where user data are
stored and maintained by cloud servers. It allows users to access their data via computer networks at anytime and from
anywhere.
Despite the great benefits provided by cloud computing, data security is a very important but challenging problem that
must be solved. One of the major concerns of data security is data integrity in a remote storage system [1,9]. Although
storing data on the cloud is attractive, it does not always offer any guarantee on data integrity and retrievability. Simple
data integrity check in a remote data storage can be done by periodically examining the data files stored on the cloud
server, but such an approach can be very expensive if the amount of data is huge. An interesting problem is to check
data integrity remotely without the need of accessing the full copy of data stored on the cloud server. For example,
the data owner possesses some verification token (e.g. a digest of the data file [5, 6]), which is very small compared
with the stored dataset. However, a number of security issues have been found in previous research [15–17]. Several
techniques, such as Proof of Retrievability (POR) [8, 11] and Third Party Auditing (TPA) [13, 14, 17], have been
proposed to solve the above data integrity checking problem with public auditability. POR is loosely speaking a kind
of Proof of Knowledge (POK) [3] where the knowledge is the data file, while TPA allows any third party (or auditor)
to perform the data integrity checking on behalf of the data owner just based on some public information (e.g. the data
owner’s public key). Several schemes with public auditability have been proposed in the context of ensuring remotely
stored data integrity under different system and security models [2, 8, 11, 17].
Intuitively, it is important that an auditing process should not introduce new vulnerabilities of unauthorized informa-
tion leakage towards the data security [12]. The previous efforts in Remote Integrity Checking (DIC) accommodate
several security features including data integrity and confidentiality, which mainly ensure secure maintenance of data.
However, they do not cover the issue of data privacy, which means that the communication flows (DIC proofs) from
the cloud server should not reveal any useful information to the adversary. Intuitively, by “privacy”, we mean that
an adversary should not be able to distinguish which file has been uploaded by the client to the cloud server. We
refer it as Zero Knowledge. We believe that it is very important to consider such privacy issues adequately in protocol
designs. Taking some existing TPA based DIC proofs [13, 15, 17] as an example, the proof sent by the cloud server to
the auditor does not allow the auditor to recover the file, but the auditor can still distinguish which file (among a set of
possible files) is involved in the DIC proof, which is clearly undesirable.
In this paper, we propose an Zero Knowledge-based definition of data privacy (DIC-Privacy) for TPA based DIC pro-
tocols. We show that two recently published DIC schemes [13,17] are insecure under our new definition, which means
some information about the user file is leaked in the DIC proof. We then provide an new construction to demonstrate
how DIC-privacy can be achieved. We show that by applying the Witness Zero Knowledge proof technique [7], we
are able to achieve DIC-privacy in DIC protocols. To the best of our knowledge, our construction is the first scheme
that can achieve DIC-privacy.
Paper Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the security model and
definition of data privacy for DIC proofs. In Section 3, we analyze the DIC protocols by Wang et al. and show why
their DIC protocols fail to capture data privacy. In Section 4, we demonstrate how data privacy can be achieved with a
witness Zero Knowledge proof. We also provide the definition of soundness for DIC proofs and show the soundness
of our protocol based on witness Zero Knowledge proof. We conclude the paper in Section 6.
2 Definitions and Security Model
DIC Protocols. We will focus on TPA based Data Integrity Checking (DIC) protocols for cloud data storage systems.
The protocol involves three entities: the cloud storage server, the cloud user, and the third party auditor (TPA). The
cloud user relies on the cloud storage server to store and maintains his/her data. Since the user no longer keeps the
data locally, it is of critical importance for the user to ensure that the data are correctly stored and maintained by the
cloud server. In order to avoid periodically data integrity verification, the user will resort to a TPA for checking the
integrity of his/her outsourced data. To be precise, an DIC protocol for cloud storage consists of five algorithms:
• KeyGen: Taking as input a security parameter λ, the algorithm KeyGen generates the public and private key
pair (pk, sk) of a cloud user (or data owner).
• TokenGen: Taking as input a file F and the user private key sk, this algorithm generates a file tag t (which
includes a file name name) and an authenticator σ for F . The file and file tag, as well as the authenticator
are then stored in the cloud server.
• Challenge: Given the user public key pk and a file tag t, this algorithm is run by the auditor to generate a
random challenge chal for the cloud server.
• Respond: Taking as input (F, t, σ, chal), this algorithm outputs a proof P , which is used to prove the
integrity of the file.
• Verify: Taking as input (pk, t, chal,P), the algorithm outputs either True or False.
DIC Privacy. We define the data privacy for DIC proofs via an Zero Knowledge game between a simulator S (i.e. the
cloud server or prover) and an adversaryA (i.e. the auditor or verifier).
Setup: The simulator runs KeyGen to generate (sk, pk) and passes pk to the adversaryA.
Phase 1: A is allowed to make Token Generation queries. To make such a query,A selects a file F and sends it to S.
S generates a file tag t, an authenticator σ, and then returns (t, σ) to A.
Phase 2: A chooses two different files F0, F1 that have not appeared in Phase 1, and send them to S. S calculates
(t0, σ0) and (t1, σ1) by running the TokenGen algorithm. S then tosses a coin b ∈ {0, 1}, and sends tb back to A. A
generates a challenge chal and sends it to S. S generates a proof P based on (Fb, tb, σb) and A’s challenge chal and
then sends P to A. Finally, A outputs a bit b′ as the guess of b. The process is illustrated in Figure 1.
Define the advantage of the adversaryA as
AdvA(λ) = |Pr[b
′ = b]− 1/2|.
Definition 1 An DIC proof has Zero Knowledge if for any polynomial-time algorithm, AdvA(λ) is a negligible func-
tion of the security parameter λ.
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F0, F1
−−−−→ Calculate:
(ti, σi) = TokenGen(sk, Fi) for i = 0, 1
Randomly select b ∈ {0, 1}
tb←−−−− Send tb back to A
Generate a challenge chal
chal
−−−−→
Calculate the proof P
Make a guess b′
P
←−−−−
Figure 1: Zero knowledge Proof game run betweenA and S
3 Privacy Analysis of Existing DIC Protocols
3.1 Notations and Preliminaries
Before describing some existing DIC protocols, we first introduce some notations and tools used in those protocols.
We denote F the data file to be stored in the cloud. It is decomposed as a sequence of n blocksm1, ...,mn ∈ Zp for
some large prime p. We denote byH(·) and h(·) cryptographic hash functions.
Let G1, G2 and GT be multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p. Let g1 and g be generators of G1 and G2,
respectively. A bilinear map is a map e : G1 × G2 → GT such that for all u ∈ G1, v ∈ G2 and a, b ∈ Zp,
e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab. Also, the map e must be efficiently computable and non-degenerate (i.e. e(g1, g) 6= 1). In
addition, let ψ denote an efficiently computable isomorphism fromG2 to G1, with ψ(g) = g1 [4].
3.2 A DIC Protocol by Wang et al. [17]
In [17], Wang et al. presented a DIC protocol based on Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) [10]. Their protocol works as
follows.
Setup Phase: The cloud user generates the keys and authentication tokens for the files as follows.
KeyGen: The cloud user runs KeyGen to generate the public and private key pair. Specifically, the user generates a
random verification and signing key pair (spk, ssk) of a digital signature scheme, and set the public key pk = (v, spk)
and sk = (x, ssk) where x is randomly chosen from Zp and v = g
x.
TokenGen: Given a file F = (m1,m2, · · · ,mn), the client chooses a file name name, a random element u ∈ G1
and calculates the file tag
t = name‖n‖u‖SSigssk(name‖n‖u),
and authenticators σi = (H(mi) · u
mi)
x
whereH is a cryptographic hash function modeled as a random oracle. The
client then generates a rootR based on the construction of Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) where the leave nodes of the tree
are an ordered set of hash values H(mi)(i = 1, 2, · · · , n). The client then signs the root R under the private key x:
sigsk(H(R)) = (H(R))
x and sends {F, t, {σi}, sigsk(H(R))} to the cloud server.
Audit Phase: The TPA first retrieves the file tag t and verifies the signature SSigssk(name‖n‖u) by using spk. The
TPA then obtains name and u.
Challenge: To generate chal, TPA picks a random subset I = {s1, s2, s3, ..., sc} of set [1, n], where s1 ≤ · · · ≤ sc.
Then, the TPA sends a challenge chal = {i, νi}i∈I to the cloud server where νi is randomly selected from Zp.
Response: Upon receiving the challenge chal = {i, νi}i∈I , the cloud server computes µ =
∑
i∈I νimi and σ =∏
i∈I σ
νi
i . The cloud server will also provide the verifier with a small amount of auxiliary information {Ωi}i∈I , which
are the node siblings on the path from the leaves H(mi)i∈I to the root R of the MHT. The server sends the proof
P = {µ, σ, {H(mi),Ωi}i∈I , sigsk(H(R))} to the TPA.
3
Verify: Upon receiving the responses form the cloud server, the TPA generates the root R using {H(mi),Ωi}i∈I , and
authenticates it by checking
e(sigsk(H(R)), g) = e(H(R), v).
If the authentication fails, the verifier rejects by emitting FALSE. Otherwise, the verifier checks
e(σ, g) = e((
sc∏
i=s1
H(mi)
νi)uµ, v).
If the equation holds, output True; otherwise, output False.
3.2.1 Zero knowledge Proof Analysis
It is easy to see that the above DIC protocol does not provide DIC-Privacy. Let A denote an Zero Knowledge Proof
adversary which works as follows (also see Fig. 2).
• A chooses distinct files F0 = (m
(0)
1 , · · · ,m
(0)
n ) and F1 = (m
(1)
1 , · · · ,m
(1)
n ) wherem
(0)
i 6= m
(1)
i .
• S chooses at random a file Fb for b ∈ {0, 1} and then computes tb, {σ
(b)
i }, sigsk(H(R
(b))).
• A chooses a random challenge chal = {i, νi}i∈I .
• S computes and sends to A the response
P = (µ(b), σ(b), {H(m
(b)
i ),Ω
(b)
i }i∈I , sigsk(H(R
(b)))).
• A chooses i ∈ I and calculatesH(m
(0)
i ) and compare it with the receivedH(m
(b)
i ). If they are equal, output
0; otherwise, output 1.
Probability Analysis. It is easy to see that A has an overwhelming probability to guess the value of b correctly since
the probability that
m
(0)
i 6= m
(1)
i ∧H(m
(0)
i ) = H(m
(1)
i )
is negligible since the hash function is assumed to be a random oracle in [17].
A S
Generate two distinct files:
F0 = (m
(0)
1 , · · · ,m
(0)
n )
F1 = (m
(1)
1 , · · · ,m
(1)
n )
F0, F1
−−−−→ Randomly chooses one file Fb for b ∈ {0, 1}
Generate file tag and authenticators
chal = {i, νi}i∈I
chal
−−−−→ Compute µ(b) =
∑
i∈I νim
(b)
i and
σ(b) =
∏
i∈I(σ
(b)
i )
νi
Prepare {Ωi}i∈I , sigsk(H(R
(b)))
Set the proof
P = µ(b), σ(b), {H(m
(b)
i ),Ω
(b)
i }i∈I ,
sigsk(H(R
(b)))
P
←−−−−
CalculateH(m
(0)
1 )
IfH(m
(0)
1 ) = H(m
(b)
1 )
return 0
Otherwise, return 1
Figure 2: Zero Knowledge analysis on Wang et al.’s DIC Protocol [17].
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TPA Cloud Server
1. Retrieve file tag t and verify
its signature. Quit if fail.
2. Generate a random challenge
chal = {i, νi}i∈I
chal
−−−−→ 3. Compute µ′ =
∑
i∈I νimi and
σ =
∏
i∈I σ
νi
i ;
4. Randomly pick r← Zp and compute
R = e(u, v)r and γ = h(R);
6. Compute γ = h(R) and then
µ,σ,R
←−−−− 5. Compute µ = r + γµ′ mod p
verify (µ, σ,R).
Figure 3: The third party auditing protocol by Wang et al. [13].
3.3 Another Privacy Preserving DIC Protocol by Wang et al. [13]
In [13], Wang et al. introduced a new DIC protocol. Compared with the DIC protocol presented above, this new
protocol aims to achieve the additional property of privacy preserving (i.e. the TPA cannot learn the content of the file
in the auditing process).
Let (p,G1, G2, GT , e, g1, g,H, h) be the system parameters as introduced above. Wang et al.’s privacy-preserving
public auditing scheme works as follows (also see Fig. 3):
Setup Phase:
KeyGen: The cloud user runs KeyGen to generate the public and private key pair. Specifically, the user generates a
random verification and signing key pair (spk, ssk) of a digital signature scheme, a random x← Zp, a random element
u← G1, and computes v ← g
x. The user secret key is sk = (x, ssk) and the user public key is pk = (spk, v, u).
TokenGen: Given a data file F = (m1, ...,mn), the user first chooses uniformly at random from Zp a unique
identifier name for F . The user then computes authenticator σi for each data block mi as σi ← (H(Wi) · u
mi)x ∈
G1 where Wi = name‖i. Denote the set of authenticators by φ = {σi}1≤i≤n. Then the user computes t =
name‖SSigssk(name) as the file tag for F , where SSigssk(name) is the user’s signature on name under the signing
key ssk. It was assumed that the TPA knows the number of blocks n. The user then sends F along with the verification
metadata (φ, t) to the cloud server and deletes them from local storage.
Audit Phase: The TPA first retrieves the file tag t and verifies the signature SSigssk(name) by using spk. The TPA
quits by emitting ⊥ if the verification fails. Otherwise, the TPA recovers name.
Challenge: The TPA generates a challenge chal for the cloud server as follows: first picks a random c-element subset
I = {s1, ..., sc} of set [1, n], and then for each element i ∈ I , chooses a random value νi ∈ Zp. The TPA sends
chal = {(i, νi)}i∈I to the cloud server.
Response: Upon receiving the challenge chal, the server generates a response to prove the data storage correctness.
Specifically, the server chooses a random element r ← Zp, and calculates R = e(u, v)
r ∈ GT . Let µ
′ denote the
linear combination of sampled blocks specified in chal: µ′ =
∑
i∈I νimi. To blind µ
′ with r, the server computes
µ = r + γµ′ mod p, where γ = h(R) ∈ Zp. Meanwhile, the server also calculates an aggregated authenticator
σ =
∏
i∈I σ
νi
i . It then sends (µ, σ,R) as the response to the TPA.
Verify: Upon receiving the response (µ, σ,R) from the cloud server, the TPA validates the response by first computing
γ = h(R) and then checking the following verification equation
R · e(σγ , g)
?
= e((
sc∏
i=s1
H(Wi)
νi )γ · uµ, v). (1)
The verification is successful if the equation holds.
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Generate two distinct files:
F0 = (m
(0)
1 , · · · ,m
(0)
n )
F1 = (m
(1)
1 , · · · ,m
(1)
n )
F0, F1
−−−−−→ Randomly choose Fb for b ∈ {0, 1}
Generate the file tag tb and
authenticators {σ
(b)
i } for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
chal = {i, νi}i∈I
chal
−−−−−→ Compute µ′ =
∑
i∈I(νim
(b)
i ) and
σ(b) =
∏
i∈I(σ
(b)
i )
νi ;
Randomly pick r ← Zp and
compute
R = e(u, v)r and γ = h(R);
Compute µ′0 =
∑
i∈I(νim
(0)
i ).
µ, σ(b), R
←−−−−− Compute µ = r + γµ′ mod p
Check if
e(
∏
i∈I(H(Wi))
νiuµ
′
0 , v) = e(σ(b), g).
If true, output 0; otherwise, output 1.
Figure 4: Zero Knowledge analysis on Wang et al. DIC Protocol [13].
3.3.1 Zero Knowledge Analysis
In [13], it has been shown that the DIC proof is privacy preserving. That is, the TPA cannot recover the file F from the
proof. This is done by concealing the value of µ′. However, we found that such a treatment could not guarantee that
there is no information leakage during the auditing process. Below we show that Wang et al.’s scheme cannot achieve
Zero Knowledge. Let A denote an Zero Knowledge Proof adversary which works as follows (also see Fig. 4).
• A chooses two distinct files F0 = (m
(0)
1 , · · · ,m
(0)
n ) and F1 = (m
(1)
1 , · · · ,m
(1)
n ) such that m
(0)
i 6= m
(1)
i for
1 ≤ i ≤ n.
• S randomly chooses a file Fb for b ∈ {0, 1} and computes the file tag tb and authenticators {σ
(b)
i }.
• After receiving the tag tb, A chooses a random challenge chal = {i, νi}i∈I .
• S computes and sends to A the response P = (µ, σ(b), R).
• A computes µ′0 =
∑
i∈I(νim
(0)
i ) and checks if
e(
∏
i∈I
(H(Wi))
νiuµ
′
0 , v) = e(σ(b), g).
If it is true, return 0; otherwise, return 1.
Probability Analysis. If b = 0, then σ(b) = σ(0) and the equation
e(
∏
i∈I
(H(Wi))
νiuµ
′
0 , v) = e(σ(0), g)
always holds. On the other hand, if b = 1, then σ(b) = σ(1) and
e(
∏
i∈I
(H(Wi))
νiuµ
′
0 , v) = e(σ(1), g)
holds only when
µ′0(=
∑
i∈I
(νim
(0)
i )) = µ
′
1(=
∑
i∈I
(νim
(1)
i )),
which happens only with probability 1/p for randomly selected {νi}i∈I . Therefore,A has an overwhelming probabil-
ity to guess the value of b correctly.
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4 A New DIC Protocol with DIC-Privacy
In order to achieve the DIC-privacy, we adopt the Witness Zero Knowledge Proof of Knowledge technique proposed
by Groth and Sahai [7]. Their method can be applied to pairing groups. Our goal is to protect both the file and the
corresponding authenticator so that the adversary cannot learn any information about the file.
Similar to Wang et al.’s scheme [13] reviewed in Section 3.3, our scheme is still based on the “aggregate authenticator”
introduced by Shacham and Waters [11]. That is, the cloud server will prove that the equation
e(σ, g) = e((
Sc∏
i=S1
H(Wi)
νi)uµ
′
, v) (2)
holds, where µ′ =
∑
i∈I νimi and σ =
∏
i∈I σ
νi
i . We will treat (u
µ′ , σ) as the witness when applying the Groth-Sahai
proof system, and rewrite Equation 2 as follows
e(σ, g)e(uµ
′
, v−1) = e((
Sc∏
i=S1
H(Wi)
νi), v). (3)
In order to protect the privacy of µ′ (or uµ
′
) and σ, the user computes an additional commitment key ~u = (u1, u2) of
the form
u1 = (u, u
α), u2 = (u
τ , uτα),
where α, τ are selected from Zp at random and u is the same generator of G1 used in Wang et al.’s scheme. This
additional commitment key ~u is now part of the user public key. To hide uµ
′
and σ, the Cloud Server computes the
commitments ~c = (c1, c2) as
c1 = (c11, c12) = (u
r11+r12τ , uα(r11+r12τ)σ),
c2 = (c21, c22) = (u
r21+r22τ , uα(r21+r22τ)uµ
′
).
where ri,j (i, j ∈ {1, 2}) are randomly selected from Zp. The Cloud Server also computes
~π = (π1, π2) = ((1, g
r11v−r21), (1, gr12v−r22)).
and sends (~c, ~π) as the response to the TPA.
TPA then verifies the response sent by the Cloud Server by checking the equality of
~c •
(
1 g
1 v−1
)
= ιT (tT )(~u • ~π) (4)
where tT represents the right hand side of Equation (3) and ιT denotes the following transformation:
tT →
(
1 1
1 tT
)
.
The “•” operation is defined as follows: define a function
F ((x1, x2), (y1, y2)) =
(
e(x1, y1) e(x1, y2)
e(x2, y1) e(x2, y2)
)
for (x1, x2) ∈ G
2
1 and (y1, y2) ∈ G
2
2, and the “•” operation is defined as
~x • ~y = F (x1, y1)F (x2, y2).
Correctness. To verify Equation (4),
Left = ~c •
(
1 g
1 v−1
)
=
(
e(c11, 1) e(c11, g)
e(c12, 1) e(c12, g)
)(
e(c21, 1) e(c21, v
−1)
e(c22, 1) e(c22, v
−1)
)
Right = ιT (tT )F (u1, π1)F (u2, π2)
=
(
1 1
1 tT
)(
1 e(u, gr11v−r21)
1 e(uα, gr11v−r21)
)(
1 e(uτ , gr12v−r22)
1 e(uτα, gr12v−r22)
)
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and we have
e(c11, 1)e(c21, 1) = 1 = 1 · 1 · 1
e(c12, 1)e(c22, 1) = 1 = 1 · 1 · 1
e(c11, g)e(c21, v
−1) = e(ur11+r12τ , g) · e(ur21+r22τ , v−1)
= e(u, gr11)e(ur21 , v−1)e(uτ , gr12)e(uτ , v−r22)
= e(ur11+τr12 , g)e(ur21+τr22 , v−1)
e(c12, g)e(c22, v
−1) = e(uα(r11+r12τ)σ, g)e(uα(r21+r22τ)uµ
′
, v−1)
= e(uα(r11+r12τ), g)e(uα(r21+r22τ), v−1)e(σ, g)e(uµ
′
, v−1)
= tT e(u
αr11 , g)e(uαr12τ , g)e(uαr21 , v−1)e(uαr22τ , v−1)
= tT e(u
α, gr11v−r21)e(uατ , gr12v−r22)
4.1 DIC-Privacy of Our New Scheme
Below we show that our new DIC protocol has the DIC-Privacy under the symmetDIC external Diffie-Hellman
(SXDH) assumption [7]. Let gk = (λ, p,G1, G2, GT , e, g1, g2) define a bilinear map e : G1 × G2 → GT where
gb is a generator of Gb for b = {0, 1}. The SXDH assumption holds if for any polynomial time algorithm A and any
b ∈ {1, 2} we have
|Pr[x, y ← Z∗p : A(gk, g
x
b , g
y
b , g
xy
b ) = 1]− Pr[x, y, r← Z
∗
p : A(gk, g
x
b , g
y
b , g
r
b ) = 1]| ≤ ǫ
where ǫ is negligible in the security parameter λ.
Theorem 1 Our new DIC protocol has DIC-Privacy if the SXDH problem is hard.
Proof 1 LetA denote an adversary who has a non-negligible advantage ǫ in winning the Zero Knowledge Proof game,
we construct another algorithm B which can solve the SXDH problem also with a non-negligible probability.
B receives a challenge gk,A = ux, B = uy, C = uz where gk = (p,G1, G2, GT , e, u, g) and z is either xy or a
random element ξ in Zp. B sets up the Zero Knowledge Proof game forA as follows
1. B uses the information in gk to generate all the systems parameters and public/private keys as described in
Wang et al.’s TPA scheme (Sec. 3.3).
2. B also sets the values of the commitment key ~u = (u1, u2) in our scheme as u1 = (u,A) and u2 = (B,C).
Upon receiving the two files F0 and F1 from A, B simulates the game as follows. B generates a random file identifier
name and the file tag t = name‖SSigssk(name), and uses name and the secret key x to compute the authenticators
{σ
(0)
i } (for F0) and {σ
(1)
i } (for F1) honestly. After that, B sends the file tag t back toA. Upon receiving the challenge
chal from A, B computes µ′0, µ
′
1, and the corresponding aggregated authenticators σ
(0) and σ(1) honestly. B then
tosses a random coin b← {0, 1}, and generates the response to A as follows.
1. Randomly choose r11, r12, r21, r22 from Zp.
2. Compute c11 = u
r11Br12 , c12 = A
r11Cr12σ(b), c21 = u
r21Br22 , c22 = A
r21Cr22uµ
′
b .
3. Compute ~π = (π1, π2) = ((1, g
r11v−r21), (1, gr12v−r22)).
B then sends the response (~c, ~π) to A. If A outputs b′ such that b′ = b, then B outputs 1; otherwise B outputs 0.
Case 1: z = xy. In this case, the distribution of the response (~c, ~π) is identically to that of a real response, and hence
we have
Pr[b′ = b] = 1/2 + ǫ.
Case 2: z = ξ. In this case, the commitment scheme is perfectly hiding. That is, for a valid proof (~c, ~π) satisfying
equation 4, it can be expressed as a proof for (uµ
′
0 , σ0) (with randomness (r
0
11, r
0
12, r
0
21, r
0
22)), or a proof for (u
µ′1 , σ1)
(with randomness (r111, r
1
12, r
1
21, r
1
22)). Therefore, we have
Pr[b′ = b] = 1/2.
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Combining both cases, we have
Pr[B(gk, ux, uy, uxy) = 1)]− Pr[B(gk, ux, uy, uξ) = 1)]
= Pr[b′ = b|z = xy]− Pr[b′ = b|z = ξ]
= ǫ.
4.2 Soundness of the Protocol
Having shown the Zero Knowledge Proof feature of the protocol, we have seen that adversary A cannot distinguish
the file that has been used by the cloud server in an DIC proof. The remanning task is to prove the “soundness” of the
protocol. We say a protocol is sound if it is infeasible for the cloud server to change a file without being caught by the
TPA in an auditing process. We formally define the soundness games between a simulator B and an adversaryA (i.e.
the cloud server) as follows.
• Key Generation. B generates a user key pair (sk, pk) by running KeyGen, and then provides pk to A.
• Phase 1. A can now interact with B and make at most ℓ Token Generation queries. In each query, A sends
a file Fi = {mi1,mi2, · · · ,min}(1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ) to B, which responds with the corresponding file tag ti and
authentication tokens φi = {σij} (1 ≤ j ≤ n).
• Phase 2. A outputs a file F ∗ and a file tag t∗ such that t∗ = ti but F
∗ 6= Fi for an i ∈ [1, ℓ] (i.e. at least
one message block of Fi has been modified by A). B then plays the role as the verifier and executes the DIC
protocol with A by sending a challenge chal∗ = {j, νj} which contains at least one index j such that F
∗
differs from Fi in the j-th message block.
• Decision. Based on the proof P∗ computed by A, B makes a decision which is either True or False.
Definition 2 We say a witness Zero Knowledge Proof DIC protocol is ǫ-sound if
Pr[B outputs True] ≤ ǫ.
Below we prove that our DIC protocol is sound under the co-CDH assumption. Let (p,G1, G2, GT , e, g1, g) be the
systems parameters defined as above where e : G1 × G2 → GT is a bilinear map. Let ψ : G2 → G1 denote an
efficiently computable isomorphism such that ψ(g) = g1.
Computational co-Diffie-Hellman (co-CDH) Problem on (G1, G2): Given g1, u ∈ G1 and g, g
a ∈ G2 as input
where g1 and g are generators of G1 and G2 respectively, a is randomly chosen from Zp, and u is randomly chosen
fromG1, compute u
a ∈ G1.
Theorem 2 The proposed witness Zero Knowledge Proof DIC protocol is negl(λ)-sound, where negl(λ) is a negligi-
ble function of the security parameter λ, if the co-CDH problem is hard.
Proof 2 Our proof is by contradiction. We show that if there exists an adversary A that can win the soundness game
with a non-negligible probability, then we can construct another adversary B which can solve the co-CDH problem
also with a non-negligible probability.
According to the soundness game, F ∗ = {m∗1,m
∗
2, · · · ,m
∗
n} must be different from the original file Fi =
{m1,m2, · · · ,mn} associated with t
∗ (or ti). That means there must exist an i ∈ [1, n] such that m
∗
i 6= mi. Below
we show that if A can pass the verification for µ∗ where µ∗ =
∑
i∈I νim
∗
i and at lease one of {m
∗
i }i∈I is modified by
A, then B can solve the co-CDH problem.
B is given an instance of the co-CDH problem (g1, u, g, g
x) where g1 and g are generators of G1 andG2 respectively
such that ψ(g) = g1, and u is a random element in G1. B’s goal is to compute u
x ∈ G1. B honestly generates
the signing key pair (spk, ssk), α, τ ∈ Zp and the commitments key u1 = (u, u
α), u2 = (u
τ , uτα) according to the
protocol specification. B also sets gx as value of v in the user public key, but the value of x is unknown to B. B then
simulates the game as follows.
Phase 1: B answers A’s queries in Phase 1 as follows. To generate a file tag ti for a file Fi, B first chooses name at
random and generates the file tag ti = name‖SSigssk(name). For each block mj(1 ≤ j ≤ n) in Fi, B chooses at
random rj ∈R Zp and programs the random oracle
H(Wj) = g
rj
1 /u
mj .
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B then computes
σj = (H(Wj)u
mj )x = (g
rj
1 )
x = (ψ(v))ri .
It is easy to verify that σj is a valid authenticator with regards tomj .
Phase 2: Suppose A outputs a response P∗ = (~c, ~π) for t∗, {m∗i }i∈I and challenges {νi}i∈I where at least one m
∗
i
has been modified by the adversary. Denote µ∗ =
∑
i∈I νim
∗
i .
Let µ =
∑
i∈I νimi and σ = Πi∈Iσ
νi
i denote the original file and authenticator that satisfy
e(σ, g) = e((
∏
i∈I
H(Wi)
νi)uµ, v). (5)
B then uses the value of τ , which is used to generate the commitment key ~u, to obtain σ∗ = c12/c
α
11 and u
µ∗ = c22/c
α
21
from the commitment ~c = (c1, c2). Since P
∗ can pass the verification, from Equation 4 we have
e(σ∗, g) = e((
∏
i∈I
H(Wi)
νi)uµ
∗
, v). (6)
From Equation 5 and Equation 6, we can obtain
e(σ∗/σ, g) = e(uµ
∗−µ, v).
Since B chooses the challenges νi randomly, with overwhelming probability 1 − 1/p, µ
∗ =
∑
i∈I νim
∗
i 6=∑
i∈I νimi = µ, and hence B can obtain
ux = (σ∗/σ)
1
µ∗−µ .
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied a new desirable security notion called DIC-Privacy for remote data integrity checking proto-
cols for cloud storage. We showed that several well-known DIC protocols cannot provide this property, which could
render the privacy of user data exposed in an auditing process. We then proposed a new DIC protocol which can pro-
vide DIC-Privacy. Our construction is based on an efficient Witness Zero Knowledge Proof of Knowledge system. In
addition, we also proved the soundness of the newly proposed protocol, which means the cloud server cannot modify
the user data without being caught by the third party auditor in an auditing process.
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